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Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung 
Praktisch alle Beiträge zur Ausbildungsmotivation deutscher Unternehmen gehen 
von dem stilisierten Fakt aus, dass die Unternehmen während der Ausbildungszeit 
Nettokosten zahlen müssen. Diese Behauptung stützt sich hauptsächlich auf nur 
eine Quelle – eine Serie von deskriptiven Querschnittstudien zu Kosten und 
Nutzen der dualen Ausbildung des Bundesinstituts für Berufsbildung (BIBB). 
Während viele einflussreiche theoretische Beiträge motivieren, weshalb die 
Unternehmen Nettokosten der Ausbildung akzeptieren, wurde der stilisierte Fakt 
selbst bisher nicht in Frage gestellt. Dieses Papier präsentiert deshalb eine die 
bisherige Literatur ergänzende Validierung der Nettokostenhypothese. Wir führen  
die erste kausale Untersuchung des Einflusses des Lehrlingsanteils auf den 
Betriebsgewinn durch. Wir nutzen hierfür multivariate Panelschätzmethoden, um 
unterschiedliche Quellen von Schätzverzerrungen und umgekehrter Kausalität 
berücksichtigen zu können. Unser Papier zeigt, dass zwischen unterschiedlichen 
Berufsgruppen unterschieden werden muss, wenn die Kosten und Nutzen der 
Ausbildung bewertet werden sollen. Insbesondere hat der Anteil von Lehrlingen in 
Handels-, Handwerks- und Bauberufen sowie kaufmännischen Berufen einen 
positiven Einfluss auf den Betriebsgewinn. Lehrlinge sind somit Substitute für Un- 
oder Angelernte sind. Im Gegensatz dazu reduziert eine Erhöhung des 
Lehrlingsanteils in Fertigungsberufen den Unternehmensgewinn. Dies bedeutet, 
dass die Unternehmen, die Lehrstellen in diesen Berufen anbieten, ihre 
Ausbildungskosten während der Ausbildungsperiode nicht decken können. Die 
Lehrlingsausbildung ist für diese Betriebe somit eine Investition. Unser Beitrag 
zeigt gleichzeitig die Effizienz des deutschen Lehrlingssystems: es erlaubt den 
Unternehmen, in allgemeines und berufsspezifisches Humankapital in hoch 
spezialisierten Berufen wie Fertigungsberufen zu investieren. Zudem können 
Unternehmen in anderen Berufen, in denen Fähigkeiten allgemeiner und die 
Mobilität höher sind, kostenneutral ausbilden.  
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Nontechnical Summary 
Almost all papers on the motivation of German firms to train apprentices take as a 
stylised fact that training firms have to incur net costs. This notion stems 
practically from one source only – a series of descriptive cross section analyses of 
the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training conducted by the Federal Institute 
for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB). While an influential theoretical 
literature tries to motivate why firms should accept net training costs, the stylised 
fact itself has not been further tested. This paper therefore presents a 
complementary validation of the net cost hypothesis by simulating the decision 
personnel managers have to take when they want to replace unskilled or semi-
skilled employees by apprentices. It is the first causal assessment of the impact 
different occupational groups of apprentices have on gross enterprise profits. We 
use multivariate panel estimation techniques because we can hereby tackle several 
sources of estimation bias and reversed causality. Our paper shows that it is 
necessary to discriminate between different groups of occupations when assessing 
the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training. In particular, we find that the 
share of apprentices in trade, commercial, craft and construction occupations has a 
positive impact on contemporary gross profits and the apprentices are substitutes 
for unskilled or semi-skilled workers. In contrast, an increase in the share of 
apprentices in the manufacturing occupations reduces contemporary gross profits. 
This means that enterprises offering apprenticeships in manufacturing occupations 
do not cover their training costs during the apprenticeship period. The 
apprenticeship training rather is a human capital investment. This paper 
demonstrates the efficiency of the German apprenticeship system: it allows 
companies to provide general and occupation-specific skills in highly specified 
occupations such as manufacturing. Otherwise, it offers cost-neutral 
apprenticeships in occupations where skills are more general and the mobility is 
higher, such as commercial or trade occupations.  
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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the short-term costs and benefits of apprenticeship training 
in Germany. It calls into question the popular stylised fact that apprenticeship 
training always leads to net costs during the apprenticeship period. We analyse the 
impact of the proportion of different occupational groups of apprentices on firm 
performance. We use representative matched employer–employee panel data that 
allow us to correct for different sources of estimation bias. We show that the 
proportion of apprentices in trade, commercial, craft and construction occupations 
has a direct positive impact on firm performance: the companies cover their 
training costs immediately. In contrast, companies with apprentices in the 
manufacturing occupations face net training costs during the apprenticeship period 
but gain by the long-term employment of its graduate apprentices. 
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I.  Introduction 
The German dual apprenticeship system is often regarded as a potential model for 
other countries because it allows enterprises to provide and pay for training in 
specific and general human capital (Harhoff and Kane 1997; Acemoglu and 
Pischke 1999b; Steedman 2001). From an international perspective the 
apprenticeship system achieves high skill levels among young people who have 
not had a college–based education (Freeman and Schettkat 2001). It is also 
believed to lead to relatively low youth unemployment rates because it facilitates 
an orderly school-to-work transition (Ryan 2001).  
In spite of these positive facts, the dual apprenticeship system seems to 
impose high costs on the training companies during the apprenticeship period and 
therefore forces these companies to invest in apprenticeship training. This is often 
seen as a competitive disadvantage for German companies facing increasing cost 
pressure in globalised markets. A frequently used argument is that enterprises are 
increasingly hesitant to accept net costs during the apprenticeship training period 
when they cannot be certain of retaining a sufficient number of apprenticeship 
graduates to earn these costs back after the apprenticeship period. This is a cause 
for concern because it is a widely assumed stylised fact that enterprises necessarily 
incur net costs during the apprenticeship period. This stylised fact stems from an 
influential series of descriptive cross-section costs and benefits evaluations by the 
Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (Bundesinstitut für 
Berufsbildung - BIBB), which shows that almost all training companies incur 
sizeable net costs.  
Since apprenticeships are unanimously considered to offer general skills, 
the assumption of inevitable net costs during apprenticeship training seems to be a 
puzzle because it contradicts the fundamental results of the human capital theory 
by Becker (1964). It has accordingly motivated many theoretical studies to analyse 
market imperfections as a source of company-sponsored general training (Franz 
and Soskice 1995; Acemoglu and Pischke 1998; Acemoglu and Pischke 1999a; 
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Kessler and Lülfelsmann 2006). Many seminal empirical studies of the German 
apprenticeship system also make the assumption of net costs without testing it 
(Harhoff and Kane 1997; Acemoglu and Pischke 1998; Dustmann and Schönberg 
2004). While there seems to be an abundance of theoretical explanations for the 
stylised fact of net costs, the ‘fact’ itself has not been subjected to scrutiny, 
although it is one of the keys to understanding the dual apprenticeship system and 
to evaluating it by comparison to other training systems. 
In this paper we therefore aim to shed more light on the question of whether 
German enterprises invest in human capital when they offer apprenticeships. We 
establish a causal assessment between the decision of an establishment to take on a 
certain number of apprentices and its performance. This approach contributes to 
the existing literature in two ways. First, we replicate the decision of personnel 
managers to take on an apprentice instead of an unskilled or semi-skilled 
employee including all other relevant factors. We estimate multivariate panel 
production functions in order to take into account selectivity and simultaneity of 
the share of apprentices as well as unobserved heterogeneity between 
establishments. That might bias descriptive cross-section accounts of costs and 
benefits. Second, we divide the group of apprentices into three main occupation 
categories – manufacturing occupations, craft and construction occupations, and 
trading and commercial occupations. The occupation is a better predictor for 
training costs and productive benefits than the type of training establishment, such 
as sector or firm size, which has normally been used up to now for the assessment 
of the hypothesis that enterprises incur net costs during apprenticeship training 
(Fougère and Schwerdt 2002). Thereby, we uses the fact that most occupations 
vary neither variations in specialisations nor training time. This means that 
apprentices of a certain occupation are very similar – large differences can be 
found however between the costs and benefits of manufacturing and craft 
occupations (Franz and Soskice 1995) and the skills demands in manufacturing 
and commercial occupations (Doeringer and Piore 1971).  
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We show that (an increase in) the proportion of apprentices in trade, 
commercial, craft, and construction occupations has a positive impact on 
contemporary firm performance. The apprentices´ relative productivity balances 
out their relative cost and they are potential substitutes to unskilled or semi-skilled 
workers. In contrast, apprentices in manufacturing occupations cause net training 
costs – contemporary firm performance decline when their share on the employees 
increases. This means that enterprises employing apprentices in metal-working or 
electronics, for example, have to invest in human capital during the training period 
and they profit from employing the apprenticeship graduates.  
These results shed new light on discussions of the German apprenticeship 
system. The most important conclusion is that the system does not represent an 
anomaly, because enterprises do not accept net costs during apprenticeship 
training in which they provide general skills to apprentices who may potentially 
leave after the apprenticeship period. Apprentices in commercial and trade 
occupations, such as clerks, are sufficiently productive during their apprenticeship 
to cover the costs of their training themselves. These occupations require more 
general skills, ones that are applicable in different enterprises and industries. 
Further, apprentices in craft occupations, such as hairdressing or brick-laying, are 
also sufficiently productive to cover their training expenditure during the 
apprenticeship. On the one hand these apprentices quickly realise productivity 
gains and on the other hand they receive relatively low wages (Wolter et al. 2006). 
Finally, manufacturing apprentices require a larger share of specific skills that take 
time to acquire. In addition, they earn substantially higher wages on average than 
apprentices in craft occupations. They can apply their skills only in a specific 
industry and they are often part of strong internal labour markets. Therefore, firms 
can afford to exempt their manufacturing apprentices from paying for their 
training themselves during the training period. Furthermore, our results 
demonstrate the efficiency of the dual apprenticeship system: it incurs net costs 
only for those companies in manufacturing occupations. Here firms have to invest 
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in order to obtain adequately trained employees because these are not easily 
available on the labour market. Interestingly, in these occupations, companies train 
apprentices also in mostly school-based systems for vocational education – here 
Britain is an example (Ryan et al. 2007). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: first we present an 
overview of the discussion of whether establishments incur net costs during 
apprenticeship training (section 2). Then we describe our theoretical framework of 
apprenticeship training (section 3) and our estimation approach (section 4). In the 
fifth section we discuss our data set and in the sixth section we present the results. 
The paper ends with a discussion of our results. 
 
II. Costs and Benefits of Apprenticeship Training 
There is a broad literature that singles out the dual apprenticeship system in 
Germany as an anomaly because the companies pay for the provision of general 
human capital and they do not recoup their costs until the end of the training 
period (Franz and Soskice 1995; Harhoff and Kane 1997; Acemoglu and Pischke 
1998; Acemoglu and Pischke 1999b; Dustmann and Schönberg 2004; Lülfelsmann 
and Kessler 2006). This seems to be a puzzle because in theory, firms should be 
interested in paying only for specific non-transferable skills, while the apprentices 
should pay for general skills themselves. 
Many contributions try to solve this perceived puzzle by explaining the 
willingness of firms to pay for general human capital through reference to 
different sources of market imperfections. Outside firms might find it difficult to 
judge the quality of the training programme in other firms (Katz and Ziderman 
1990; Chang and Wang 1996) or there might be asymmetric information about the 
productivity of apprentices (Elbaum and Singh 1995; Franz and Soskice 1995; 
Acemoglu and Pischke 1998). These market imperfections would allow the firms 
to pay their own apprenticeship graduates less than the market wage for skilled 
workers and hereby recoup the net costs incurred during the apprenticeship period 
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(Acemoglu and Pischke 1999a). Moreover, there might be complementarities 
between general and firm-specific skills. General skills can be used more 
efficiently when the worker has some firm-specific knowledge and skills and it is 
possible for the training firm to obtain some of the returns of general training 
(Franz and Soskice 1995; Acemoglu and Pischke 1999a; Kessler and Lülfesmann 
2006). Furthermore, labour market institutions, such as minimum wages, unions or 
works councils, can induce enterprises to accept net costs during the 
apprenticeship period (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999a; Dustmann and Schönberg 
2004). Finally, there might be other costs for apprenticeship graduates and 
employees when apprentices move to another employer after their apprenticeship 
period, such as mobility costs, search costs, training on the job, etc. (Harhoff and 
Kane 1997; Acemoglu and Pischke 1998). 
These theoretical contributions are all based on the stylised fact of net costs 
during the apprenticeship period in Germany. The net costs assumption stems 
from a series of cost benefit studies conducted by the BIBB (Bardeleben et al. 
1997; Beicht et al. 2004). These evaluations calculated the relevant costs during 
apprenticeship training for about 50 occupations and compared them with the 
economic value of the productivity contribution of a typical apprentice. The 
evaluations are based on surveys of about 2,500 (personnel) managers who 
assessed one occupation each. They consistently find that all occupations and 96 
per cent of the companies face sizeable net costs during the apprenticeship period.1 
Drawbacks of the descriptive cross-section results may be the bias incurred by the 
endogeneity of apprenticeship training and unobserved differences between firms. 
Causality is also hard to infer here. 
The results of the descriptive costs and benefits calculations are, however, 
thrown into doubt by some recent empirical studies. First, Mohrenweiser and 
Backes-Gellner (2008) show that about 14 per cent of German training enterprises 
consistently do not take on their apprenticeship graduates during a period of 
                                                 
1 This refers to the full cost account, which is usually cited in scientific publications. 
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several years. This contradicts the notion of there being net costs during the 
apprenticeship period for virtually all training enterprises, because these 
companies have no opportunity to recoup the net costs. Second, in a costs and 
benefits study for Switzerland also based on surveys of personnel managers, 
Wolter et al. (2006) find that two-thirds of Swiss companies with fewer than 100 
employees and one-half of the larger ones are able to recoup their training costs 
during apprenticeship training. The differences between the two countries are quite 
surprising, because the training systems in both countries are very similar. Third, 
Zwick (2007) finds on the basis of multivariate panel profit estimation that an 
increase in the ratio of apprentices does not decrease profits. He concludes that, on 
average, German establishments do not face net costs during the apprenticeship 
period. 
Those studies which do not find net costs from training enterprises name 
the substitution or production motivation of the companies as an alternative to 
investment motivation (Lindley 1975). The substitution strategy states that the 
productivity of the apprentices is higher than their training costs and the unit 
labour costs of apprentices are lower than the unit labour costs of other 
substitutable employees (in general, unskilled or semi-skilled workers).  
Besides the study by Zwick (2007) there are only two studies we are aware 
of that assess the causal effect of apprenticeship training on firm performance. 
Fougère and Schwerdt (2002) analyse the contribution of apprentices on firm 
performance in Germany. They find a positive effect of apprentices on the value 
added only in medium-size firms. Askilden and Nilsen (2005) partly confirm the 
hypothesis that firms face net costs during apprenticeship training by analysing the 
recruitment of apprentices during the business cycle in Norway. They find that 
apprentices are substitutes for skilled workers and are recruited primarily in boom 
phases. However, all of these studies treat the apprentices as a homogeneous group 
and do not discriminate between the training occupations. 
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III. Theoretical Framework 
The German apprenticeship system is characterised by a duality of training sites, 
which means that the apprentices spend 1-2 days a week in a vocational school 
where they learn general and occupation-specific skills, and 3-4 days in the 
training company, where they mostly work and learn occupation-specific and firm-
specific skills (see Franz and Soskice 1995 for a concise description of the 
system). The integration of the apprentices in the production process is an 
important part of the German apprenticeship system, because the companies can 
recoup the training costs in part or in full. Lindley (1975) therefore describes 
apprentices as cheap productive workers, who can substitute for unskilled or semi-
skilled employees because of their relatively low wages. This substitution training 
strategy can therefore be analysed by a simple micro-economic production model 
with two substitutable input factors (here: apprentices and unskilled or semi-
skilled workers) where the employment shares are dependent on their relative unit 
labour costs (Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner 2008). 
In using the substitution training model we exploit the property of part-time 
productive work of the apprentices in their training companies and analyse a 
standard Cobb Douglas function, including the number of employees, weighted by 
their occupation or skill level (Dearden et al. 2006). Therefore, we aim at 
establishing a causal relationship between the decision of a company to recruit 
apprentices instead of unskilled or semi-skilled workers, and its performance.  
Accordingly, our model divides the number of employees (L) in different 
skill and occupational groups (s), where θ  refers to their performance differences: 
∑ +=
s
ss LL )1( θ . (1) 
Then we define a reference category (in our case the proportion of unskilled or 
semi-skilled employees) and multiply all summands by L
L , logarithmise, use the 
approximation )1ln( +≈ ss  for small s, define L
Ll ss = , and solve to: 
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∑+=
s
sslLL θlnln . (2) 
Then we insert (2) in a standard logarithmic Cobb Douglas function and solve this 
to get: 
∑++=
s
sitsitit lkA θβαπ lnln ,  (3) 
where π  is the establishment performance per capita, k is the capital per head and 
the ls indicate the proportions of different skill or occupational groups s in the 
company i at time t and A are other company or market characteristics. The 
parameters α  and β  are the elasticities of the Cobb Douglas function for capital 
and labour respectively and θ  presents the profit differences between the skill and 
occupational groups. 
In our approach, we do not consider the apprentices as a homogeneous 
group but divide them into three occupational categories: manufacturing 
occupations, craft and construction occupations, and trade and commercial 
occupations.2 We chose this classification because the cost/benefit relations differ 
between occupations (Wolter et al. 2006). Our occupational classification is not 
the same as that used by Beicht et al. (2004) who mainly differentiate occupations 
by the institutions involved (for example chambers of commerce and industry vs. 
chambers of crafts). In contrast, our occupational groups are chosen so that their 
impact on firm performance is as homogeneous as possible. Our classification 
takes into account the differences between blue-collar (manufacturing, crafts and 
construction) and white-collar (commercial and trade) apprentices on the one 
hand, and between manufacturing and craft occupations on the other.  
The distinction between commercial and manufacturing apprentices can be 
motivated by the internal labour market literature and the skill weights approach. 
The internal labour market literature makes a strong distinction between blue-
collar and white-collar workers in terms of the workers´ tenure and their general 
                                                 
2 The list of occupations in the three groups can be found in Table A8 in the Appendix. 
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vs. specific human capital requirements and investments (Doeringer and Piore 
1971). In detail, manufacturing apprentices face a stronger internal labour market 
and therefore a higher probability of company-sponsored training as well as a 
lower mobility after graduation because the apprenticeship is a port of entry into 
the internal labour market (Soskice 1994). A similar relation between training 
costs and the productive benefits of apprentices can be motivated by the skill 
weights approach (Lazear 2004). Here, bundles of skills are analysed and it is 
assumed that more general weighted skills bundles lead to higher job mobility. In 
our terms, commercial apprentices, such as clerks for example, acquire a more 
general weighted combination of skills such as languages, IT or social skills, and 
the apprenticeship graduates are more likely to find a better job offer elsewhere. 
Therefore, firms with apprentices in commercial occupations are forced to pursue 
a cost-neutral training strategy because they cannot be certain to recoup their 
training costs after the training period. We therefore propose our first hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1:  Apprenticeships in commercial and trade occupations do 
not involve net costs during the apprenticeship period, because the productive 
benefits cover the training expenditures. 
 
Second, the differences between manufacturing vs. craft and construction 
occupations can be explained by the greater possibility of productive work time 
during the apprenticeship of craft and construction apprentices (Wolter et al. 
2006). Prime examples are almost all construction occupations, where the 
apprentices are productive from the first training days on. For most craft 
employees, switching from one employer to another is quite widespread and easy 
because most skills are not company-specific. This is in contrast to the 
manufacturing occupations where the apprentices have to learn how to handle 
more complex machines and they cannot become productive very quickly. The 
required skills in these occupations, such as electronics or metal mechanics, are 
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training- and cost-intensive and frequently company-specific (Wolter et al. 2006). 
Further, the crafts and construction apprentices are given clearly lower training 
wages, which makes it easier to recoup the training expenditure. This leads us to 
our second and third hypotheses: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2:  Apprenticeships in manufacturing occupations involve 
net costs during the apprenticeship period. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3:  Apprenticeships in craft and construction occupations 
do not involve net costs during the apprenticeship period. 
 
IV Empirical Framework 
In order to estimate the net costs of an apprenticeship required by an occupational 
group, we use a Cobb Douglas gross profit function according to equation (3): 
tiiiititititit uxcraftsmancom ,321ln ++′+++= ηβδδδπ , (4) 
where t is a time indicator, i is an establishment indicator, com, man and crafts are 
the proportion of apprentices in commercial or trade, manufacturing, crafts or 
constructions occupations respectively. The dependent variable π measures the 
firm performance per capita and x is a column vector of other covariates including 
all variables in (3) such as capital per head and the proportion of skilled and 
unskilled workers as well as other explanatory variables. Finally, η  denotes the 
unobservable time invariant factors and u stands for the normally distributed error 
term with an expected value of zero. 
Our main focus lies on the impact of (an increase in) the share of 
apprentices from a certain occupational group on (the change in) contemporary 
gross profits. We assert that a negative impact of the contemporary share of an 
occupational group of apprentices on profits indicates net costs. An insignificant 
or even a positive correlation between the share of apprentices and gross profits 
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indicates no net costs; or, in other words, the apprentices bear their training costs 
themselves by participating in productivity. Our estimation procedure takes into 
account different sources of estimation bias or endogeneity problems such as 
selectivity, unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. In order to assess the 
changes incurred by estimation biases, and as a benchmark, we start with a pooled 
estimation, i.e. a cross-section including observations from different years. This 
increases the number of observations; it also means that a firm that appears in 
several years is seen as a separate observation unit each time. 
We control for time invariant unobserved variables influencing both firm 
performance and share of apprentices (unobserved establishment heterogeneity: 
0),( ≠ηxE ). Examples for unobserved heterogeneity are the quality of industrial 
relations or the innovation pressure facing a firm. For example, our estimation 
may be upward-biased when good industrial relations lead to better firm 
performance on the one hand and to higher training endeavours on the other hand. 
It is also conceivable that higher profits are a consequence of good personnel 
management and this can also go along with relatively high efforts put into 
apprenticeship training. Time invariant unobserved heterogeneity is avoided by 
estimating the model in first differences or by demeaning the cross-section 
equations. In other words, in our second specification we explain the change in 
firm performance from one year to the next by means of a change in the 
composition of employee qualifications and other covariates. 
A further possible source of estimation bias is the endogeneity of the share 
of apprentices. First, establishments may alter their qualification structure 
simultaneously with profits or both may be influenced by exogeneous shocks such 
as a positive trend in demand because they lead to an increase in the workforce. 
Otherwise, simultaneity can for example occur if relatively low profits are a signal 
for a structural labour costs problem which firms might try to solve by substituting 
apprentices for unskilled and skilled workers. Another source of estimation bias is 
selectivity in apprentice training. Neubäumer and Bellmann (1999) find for 
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example that the probability to train is higher in industries with low net 
apprenticeship costs. These two sources of estimation bias are removed in our 
third estimation specification by an instrumental variable panel regression. It is 
convenient, in this respect, to use general method of moments (GMM) estimations 
with internal instruments, because lagged internal instruments do not pose 
causality problems contemporary external instruments might have given the 
assumptions stated below. In addition, we do not have enough external instruments 
for the potentially endogeneous variables. More precisely, the difference GMM 
Estimator instruments the first differences of the explanatory variables with the 
corresponding levels of the lagged variables whereby potentially endogenous 
variables need the lags t-2 and predetermined ones the lags t-1 (Arellano and Bond 
1991). Therefore we make the so-called sequential exogeneity assumption 
( , , 1 , , 1 , 2( , ) 0 ( , )i t i t i t i t i tE x u E x u u− − −Δ = = − ) which means that contemporary exogenous 
shocks have no impact on lagged explanatory variables. We therefore need at least 
four time periods, where the fourth lag is the instrument. Unfortunately, the 
predictive power of the internal instruments may be small if the time series are 
highly persistent. That means in our case for example that the qualification 
structure of the employees hardly changes from one year to another. That could 
evoke biases in the GMM Estimator in first differences (Arellano and Bover 
1995). 
Therefore we prefer the so-called System GMM Estimator by Blundell and 
Bond (1998). Here, the differences are instrumented again with lagged levels as 
internal instruments and the levels of the covariates are simultaneously 
instrumented by adequate lagged differences. The main advantage of this approach 
is that besides the temporary differences, differences in levels between firms are 
also taken into account. This improves the information used in identifying the 
effect and usually enhances the precision of the estimator. A necessary condition 
for the System GMM Estimator is that the correlations between the unobserved 
fixed effects and the first differences of the covariates remain constant over time 
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(Arellano and Bover 1995).3 In our investigation this means for example that the 
particular propensity for personnel management or industrial relations does not 
change much over the analysed time period of six years. The estimations are 
carried out with the help of a two-step method under the application of 
Windmeijer’s adjustment process for variances (Windmeijer 2005), using the 
command xtabond2 in STATA 9.2 (Roodman 2006). In addition, we impose 
common factor restrictions using a minimum distance estimator in order to obtain 
a single coefficient for all covariates in the dynamic model (Blundell and Bond 
1998). 
We can identify the effect of changes in the proportion of occupational 
groups of apprentices on firm performance because of market inflexibilities, i.e. in 
this case by dismissal protection. While the firms can directly affect their share of 
apprentices, shrinking firms may face an inefficient composition of staff because 
employees cannot be replaced and laid off at will (Berthold and Fehn 1998). 
Another reason for inflexibilities and an inefficient composition of the workforce 
may be a lack of suitably skilled job applicants (Kölling 2002). As a consequence, 
some firms might not have their optimal employee mix and an increase in the 
share of a particular employee group would influence gross profits. 
 
V. Data 
Our data are taken from the waves 1997-2002 of the linked employer employee 
data set of the IAB (LIAB). The LIAB combines Federal Employment Agency 
individual-based employment statistics with plant-level data from the IAB 
Establishment Panel. The distinctive feature of the LIAB is the combination of 
administrative information on individuals and details concerning the 
establishments that employ them. 
The employment statistics of the LIAB are drawn from the German 
employment register, which contains information on more than 98 per cent of the 
                                                 
3 This is also called the stationarity assumption, given the derived stationarity from this assumption. 
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employees and trainees included in the establishment panel (Alda 2005). The 
information on the schooling level of the employees may be inconsistent because 
the information is not obligatory. Therefore we use the correction method 
proposed by Fitzenberger et al. (2006). 
To take account of the top coding of earnings at the earnings ceiling for 
social security contributions for roughly 11 per cent of the sample, we impute 
wages for those employees at the censored level. To this end, we first create 20 
cells differentiated by gender, education (the six schooling groups identified in 
Appendix Table A1) and nationality (German vs non-German), and run censored 
wage regressions for each cell. The covariates comprise age, age squared, and 
dummies for job characteristics. Further, our procedure takes into account that the 
level at which wages are top coded differs between eastern and western Germany 
and is adjusted every year. Predicted wages for each censored observation are then 
calculated and imputed for each individual.  
The plant-level component of the LIAB, the IAB Establishment Panel, was 
initiated in 1993 (Kölling 2000). It is based on a stratified random sample – strata 
for 16 industries and 10 employment size classes – from the population of all 
establishments. Although larger plants are over-sampled, within each cell the 
sampling is random.  
All labour-related variables are calculated from the reliable individual 
Social Security Records and all other company-related variables are compiled 
from the IAB Establishment Panel. We use the so-called longitudinal version of 
the LIAB which includes daily information on the employee characteristics for all 
establishments. We calculate on a monthly basis the proportion of all employment-
related variables and then derive their yearly mean. This approach is mainly 
chosen because the proportion of apprentices changes cyclically during the year, 
with a minimum around July and a maximum around the new year, and the 
training period differs between occupations: for example most apprenticeship 
training in commercial occupations takes three years while apprenticeships in 
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manufacturing usually last three and a half years. Therefore, the cross-section data 
that entail the employee characteristics on only one day per year – the 30th of June 
- underestimate the true ratio of apprentices. Even more importantly, the difference 
between the true average proportion of apprentices and the measured proportion of 
apprentices at this date differs between the groups of apprentices because of the 
different training durations (Jacobebbinghaus et al. 2008).  
In obtaining our estimation sample, we exclude not-for-profit organisations 
and agriculture and mining establishments, as well as establishments that do not 
report sales (such as banks and insurance companies). We also exclude 
establishments with fewer than 20 employees4 and any establishments that have 
more than 60 per cent apprentices in their workforce (training companies). In 
addition, only individuals aged between 19 and 64 years and covered by social 
security are included in the sample. We also omit all employees with wages lower 
than the minimum income limit for compulsory social insurance, and apprentices 
who earned more than the social security contribution ceiling. Matching the 
selected employees to the selected establishments results in a sample of 1879 
establishments. 
The firm performance variable is the gross profit per head calculated by 
subtracting the total wage bill and the inputs from firms’ revenue. We take logs in 
order to reduce the impact of outliers. As we do not have a variable directly 
indicating capital and capital costs in the panel, we can only include investments 
as a control variable proxy using the perpetual inventory method (Zwick 2004). 
We assume that using aggregated investments instead of capital is innocuous, 
especially in the estimation specifications based on differences, because it seems 
improbable that capital costs vary with the proportion of apprentices employed. 
However, in contrast to other variables it is not clear whether high investments 
boost gross profits or whether high gross profits enhance the investment affinity. 
                                                 
4 This excludes the group of firms for which the calculated net costs are near to zero (Bardeleben et al., 
1997, Beicht et al. 2004). Therefore we might actually have downwards biased results. 
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Investments, gross profits and employee characteristics are divided by the number 
of employees in order to avoid having to measure scale effects such as a positive 
correlation between the levels of investments and profits.  
 
VI. Findings 
Our three homogeneous occupational groups cover 85 per cent of all apprentices. 
More specifically, commercial and trade occupations cover 25 per cent, crafts and 
construction occupations 30 per cent and manufacturing occupations 30 per cent of 
all apprentices. The entire summary statistics on establishment (mean) 
characteristics for the estimation sample used for the System GMM regressions are 
given in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
Our pooled OLS estimation in Table 1 suggests that the contribution of 
apprentices to the gross profits in commercial or trade occupations is significantly 
positive in comparison to that of unskilled or semi-skilled workers. In contrast, the 
contribution of crafts and construction apprentices, as well as that of 
manufacturing apprentices, is significantly negative correlated with the gross 
profit. All further covariates have the expected signs (see Table A2 in the 
Appendix): higher investments per capita, the presence of works councils, 
collective bargaining, and the export share are positively correlated with gross 
profits. The share of employees with a lower than tertiary-level qualification has a 
negative correlation, while the share of employees with a higher qualification is 
positively correlated with gross profits. 
The pooled regression is possibly biased, however, because observations of 
the same firm in different years are considered as independent, and unobserved 
heterogeneity cannot be taken into account. The Fixed Effects Gross Profit 
Regression (FEM) in Tables 1 and A3 has, correspondingly, a smaller number of 
significant coefficients. The contribution of all apprentice groups to firm 
performance is now insignificant. 
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In order to tackle endogeneity, we prefer a System GMM approach with 
lagged levels respectively lagged differences as internal instruments. More 
specifically, we treat worker-related variables as potentially endogenous 
(apprentices’ occupation and job characteristics – see Appendix) and instrument 
them with lags (t-2) and all further available lags. The investment variable is seen 
as predetermined and is instrumented with lag (t-1) and further lags. All 
establishment-related variables (works councils, industry and so on, see Appendix) 
are seen as exogenous. The System GMM Estimation is reported in Table A4 in 
the Appendix. All test statistics confirm our specification (autocorrelation tests and 
test of over-identification restrictions) and the coefficients of the lagged dependent 
variable are in the expected range between the lagged OLS and the lagged FEM 
specification (Roodman 2006) – see Tables A6 and A7. 
 
Table 1: Gross Profit Estimation, Dependent Variable: log(value added minus total wage 
bill per capita) 
  OLS FEM Sys GMM 
  Coeficent t-Value Coeficient t-Value Coeficient t-Value
Share of Apprentices in:                
Commercial or Trade Occ. 1.8628 7.61  -0.3443 -0.91   0.9683 2.78  
Manufacturing Occ. -0.6416 -3.25  -0.2180 -0.65   -1.2437 -2.65  
Crafts or Constructions Occ. -0.6695 -3.62  0.2423 0.68   1.4731 3.80  
Number of Establishments 8169 2146 1879 
R² / Number of instruments 0.1773 0.0195 269 
Comments: all coefficients significant at the 1% level, full output in the Appendix Tables A2-A5, reference 
category: unskilled workers. Source: LIAB waves 1997–2002. 
 
Taking endogeneity into account shows, according to our Hypothesis 1, that 
apprentices in commercial and trade occupations have a positive impact on gross 
profits in comparison to unskilled and semi-skilled workers. In detail, a one per 
cent increase in the proportion of commercial apprentices raises the contemporary 
gross profit by around one per cent. The apprentices in commercial and trade 
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occupations are obviously on average sufficiently productive to cover the training 
expenditures during the training period. Therefore, these apprentices are potential 
substitutes for unskilled or semi-skilled workers. In accordance with our second 
hypothesis the contribution of manufacturing apprentices to the firm’s gross 
profits is negative in comparison to unskilled workers. These apprenticeships 
therefore impose net costs on the companies during the training period, and their 
benefits have to come in the form of the employment of skilled own 
apprenticeship graduates. Further, apprentices in craft and construction 
occupations have a significantly more beneficial impact on gross profits than 
unskilled workers, which confirms our third hypothesis. These apprentices cover 
their training costs through their productive working time during the 
apprenticeship. In contrast to the manufacturing occupations, these occupations do 
not need to take over the apprenticeship graduates in order to cover their net 
training costs. Finally, the lagged endogeneous variable and the proportion of 
skilled employees have a positive significant impact on profits while the 
proportion of part-time employees and the size of investments per capita have no 
impact. Exporting firms and firms with works councils have a higher gross profit 
(see Table A4 and A5 ). 
In Germany in recent years, more school leavers have applied for 
apprenticeships than enterprises have offered apprenticeship openings. In the 
public debate, frequently the argument is made that apprentices are too expensive 
and a reduction in apprentice salaries might increase the inclination of enterprises 
to offer apprenticeships (Zwick 2007). It therefore seems interesting if the 
influence of apprentices on productivity is different from their impact on gross 
profits (i.e. productivity minus the wage sum). The respective results are reported 
in Tables A2-A7. Comparing both parts of the tables suggests that usually the 
impact on productivity is more positive (or less negative) than the impact on gross 
profit. This means that the commercial apprentices are more productive than 
unskilled workers (given their productive working time) but their relatively higher 
 
 
19
training wages reduce the benefits. Nevertheless, the apprentices still have more 
favourable unit labour costs than unskilled or semi-skilled workers. Another 
possible interpretation is that the costs of an increase in the proportion of 
apprentices are higher than those for an increase in the proportion of unskilled or 
semi-skilled employees, where one has to take into account the indirect salary 
costs for supervisors. An exception is the relation between profits and productivity 
for the craft and construction occupations in the MDE specification (see Table 
A5). Here the gross profit impact is about the same as the productivity impact. 
This might be a consequence of relatively low apprentice wages and other training 
costs in enterprises that train apprentices in craft or construction occupations (or 
relatively high productivity of apprentices in relation to their relative costs). 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we also calculate everything 
in deviations from sector means. This slightly changes the interpretation because 
we cancel out the level effects between sectors. Now the question is whether a 
higher share of apprentices in certain occupations than the sector average goes 
hand in hand with a higher gross profit than the sector average. The results are 
very similar to those presented before and therefore we do not display them 
separately here. In addition, we also run all regressions for the average 
apprenticeship share instead of differentiating between occupations groups. We 
obtain a result analogous to that of Zwick (2007): on average the share of 
apprentices is uncorrelated with gross profits (and productivity). 
Summing up, we find that firms pursue a cost-neutral training strategy in 
commercial and trading as well as construction and craft occupations. In contrast, 
the apprentices in manufacturing occupations are more costly than their unskilled 
or semi-skilled potential substitutes and therefore these apprenticeships are an 
investment in human capital for the training companies. 
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VI. Conclusions  
This paper presents the first causal assessments of the impact of different 
occupational groups of apprentices on gross enterprise profits. It shows that it is 
necessary to discriminate between different groups of occupations when assessing 
the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training. In particular, we find that the 
share of apprentices in trade, commercial, craft and construction occupations has a 
positive impact on contemporary gross profits and the apprentices are potential 
substitutes for unskilled or semi-skilled workers. In contrast, an increase in the 
share of apprentices in the manufacturing occupations (which constitute about 
30% of all apprentices) reduces contemporary gross profits. This means that 
enterprises offering apprenticeships in manufacturing occupations do not cover 
their training costs during the apprenticeship period. The apprenticeship training 
rather is a human capital investment by these companies. There are usually two 
reasons proposed for the motivation of net costs during apprenticeship training. 
The first is the possibility to recoup training investments by taking apprentices 
over as skilled workers and paying them a lower than the market wage (Acemoglu 
and Pischke 1998). The second reason is that not sufficient adequately skilled 
workers are available on the labour market (Fougère and Schwerdt 2002).  
Our findings challenge the stylised fact based on descriptive cross-section 
analyses, that almost all training enterprises necessarily incur net costs during 
apprenticeship training. However, our findings are in line with the fact that a 
significant proportion of enterprises in Germany never recruit their apprenticeship 
graduates (Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner 2008), because they obviously do 
not need to recoup net costs after the apprenticeship period. It also supports the 
finding that the average proportion of apprentices does not have a significant 
impact on gross profits (Zwick 2007). Our results are, finally, also comparable 
with what is found in Switzerland. In both countries a large number of young 
people (especially in commercial, trade, craft and construction occupations) are 
trained at no net cost during their apprenticeship training (Wolter et al. 2006). 
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Adolescents in these occupations are mostly trained in schools or universities also 
in school-based vocational education systems like those in the UK. In contrast, in 
the manufacturing occupations, British companies too offer apprenticeships, which 
are also human capital investments for the companies (Ryan 2007).  
It seems promising to validate our results by directly testing the investment 
hypothesis for different occupations on the wage differences between apprentices 
who stay at their training firms and those who switch employers after the 
apprenticeship. According to our results wages of manufacturing apprentices 
should be lower if they stay while there should be no differences in wages for the 
two other groups of occupations. Moreover, future empirical studies of the 
German apprenticeship system should incorporate the occupational differences, 
especially if they test theoretical models assuming net training costs. 
This paper demonstrates the efficiency of the German apprenticeship 
system; it allows companies to provide general and occupation-specific skills in 
highly specified occupations such as manufacturing. Otherwise, it offers cost-
neutral apprenticeships in occupations where skills are more general and the 
mobility is higher, such as commercial or trade occupations. In these occupations, 
companies do not need low workforce mobility and regulated labour markets to 
make training worth their while. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics (means at establishment level) 
  mean sd minimum maximum 
Log(Value Added per Capita) 10.7928 0.8851 5.9221 16.0026 
Log(Gross Profits per Capita)* 14.7562 1.6614 6.5207 21.1845 
Apprentices Occupations:      
Commercial and Trade 0.0110 0.0246 0.0000 0.2698 
Manufacturing 0.0146 0.0315 0.0000 0.4126 
Crafts and Construction 0.0110 0.0341 0.0000 0.4506 
Other 0.0080 0.0235 0.0000 0.3341 
Job Characteristics:      
Share of Apprentices 0.0445 0.0517 0.0000 0.4773 
Share of Unskilled/Semi-skilled Workers 0.1776 0.2370 0.0000 1.0000 
Share of Skilled Workers 0.7116 0.2551 0.0000 1.0000 
Share of Part Time Workers** 0.0637 0.1422 0.0000 1.0000 
Share of Others 0.0025 0.0119 0.0000 0.4346 
Schooling Level:      
Share without a Completed Apprenticeship 0.1081 0.1232 0.0000 0.9429 
Share with a Completed Apprenticeship and 
without a Secondary School Degree 
0.7099 0.1883 0.0000 1.0000 
Share without a Completed Apprenticeship 
and with an Secondary School Degree 
0.0412 0.0489 0.0000 1.0000 
Share with a Completed Apprenticeship and 
with a Secondary School Degree 
0.0346 0.0446 0.0000 0.5946 
Share with a Polytechnic Degree 0.0488 0.0662 0.0000 0.8279 
Share with a University Degree 0.0574 0.0960 0.0000 0.8844 
Share of Foreigners 0.0369 0.0793 0.0000 0.8375 
Establishment Characteristics:      
Log(Investment per Capita)* 7.0486 3.1714 0.0000 13.9270 
Company founded during last 5 Years 0.0644 0.2455 0.0000 1.0000 
Dummy: Exporting Company 0.3913 0.4881 0.0000 1.0000 
Dummy: Works Council 0.5747 0.4944 0.0000 1.0000 
Dummy: Collective Bargaining Contract 0.6503 0.4769 0.0000 1.0000 
Dummy: Located in East Germany 0.6131 0.4871 0.0000 1.0000 
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Table A1 continued: 
Firm Size Categories:    
20 - 100 0.5881 0.7676 0.0000 1.0000 
101 - 500 0.3245 0.4682 0.0000 1.0000 
> 500 0.0874 0.2824 0.0000 1.0000
Number of Observations 5916     
Number of Establishments 1879       
* Profit per capita and investment per capita are added with a constant - the largest 
negative number found in the variables - to make sure that all values are positive and 
hence can be logarithmised. 
** Full time workers can be divided in different job characteristics but not part time 
workers.  
Source: LIAB Wave 1997 – 2002, sample used for System GMM regressions, see Tables 
A4 and A5. 
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Table A2: OLS Estimations 
  Productivity Gross Profits 
  Coef. t-Value Coef. t-Value 
Share of Apprentice Occupation Group 
(Ref.: Unskilled Workers):         
Commercial and Trade 2.3047 5.97 1.8628 7.61 
Manufacturing -0.9650 -3.10 -0.6416 -3.25 
Crafts and Construction -1.3709 -4.70 -0.6695 -3.62 
Further Job Characteristics (Ref: 
Unskilled Workers): 
        
Share of Skilled Workers 0.0613 1.24 0.0110 0.35 
Share of Part Time Workers -0.1635 -2.15 0.0719 1.49 
Schooling Level (Ref.: without Completed 
Apprenticeship and with Secondary School 
Degree): 
        
Share without a Completed Apprenticeship -0.3768 -2.97 -0.1815 -2.26 
Share with a Completed Apprenticeship 
and without a Secondary School Degree 
-0.2542 -2.89 -0.1031 -1.85 
Share with a Completed Apprenticeship 
and with an Secondary School Degree 
1.5043 6.97 0.9397 6.87 
Share with a Polytechnic Degree 0.3906 2.27 0.2322 2.13 
Share with a University Degree 0.7134 5.04 0.3197 3.56 
Share of Foreigners -0.2030 -1.37 -0.1914 -2.03 
Establishment Characteristics:         
Log(Investment per Capita) 0.0804 18.35 0.0484 17.43 
Company founded during last 5 Years 0.0415 1.28 0.0464 2.26 
Dummy: Exporting Company 0.1464 6.10 0.0752 4.94 
Dummy: Works Council 0.2079 9.29 0.0750 5.29 
Dummy: Collective Bargaining Contract 0.0458 2.13 0.0218 1.60 
Dummy: Located in East Germany -0.4437 -18.89 -0.1843 -12.38 
R2 0.2397   0.1773   
F (38, 8130) 67.46   46.11   
Number of Establishments (Observations) 8169   8169   
Notes: Regressions also include 2 firm size dummies, 11 industry, 1 dummy for employees 
with unknown occupational qualification, 1 dummy for apprentices with other 
occupations, and 5 year dummies. Productivity: log(value added per capita), Gross 
Profits: log(value added minus total wage bill per capita).  
Source: LIAB 1997-2002 
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Table A3: Fixed Effect Estimation 
  Productivity Gross Profits 
  Coef. t-Value Coef. t-Value 
Share of Apprentice Occupation Group 
(Ref.: Unskilled Workers): 
        
Commercial and Trade -0.0913 -0.15 -0.3443 -0.91 
Manufacturing -0.4404 -0.81 -0.2180 -0.65 
Crafts and Construction 0.1393 0.24 0.2423 0.68 
Further Job Characteristics (Ref: 
Unskilled Workers): 
        
Share of Skilled Workers 0.1728 1.00 0.0882 0.83 
Share of Part Time Workers 1.1293 4.56 0.6940 4.55 
Schooling Level (Ref.: without Completed 
Apprenticeship and with Secondary School 
Degree): 
        
Share without a Completed Apprenticeship 0.1043 0.26 -0.1200 -0.49 
Share with a Completed Apprenticeship 
and without a Secondary School Degree 
-0.1600 -0.47 -0.2716 -1.30 
Share with a Completed Apprenticeship 
and with an Secondary School Degree 
0.3035 0.57 -0.0288 -0.09 
Share with a Polytechnic Degree -0.0874 -0.17 -0.6528 -2.10 
Share with a University Degree -0.1808 -0.38 -0.2748 -0.94 
Share of Foreigners -1.5490 -4.08 -1.1808 -5.05 
Establishment Characteristics:         
Log(Investment per Capita) 0.0373 1.87 0.0069 0.56 
Company founded during last 5 Years -0.0153 -0.41 0.0285 1.24 
Dummy: Exporting Company 0.0192 0.65 0.0063 0.34 
R2 0.0174   0.0195   
F (23, 6019) 4.63   5.21   
Number of Establishments (Groups) 2146   2146   
Notes: Regressions include 2 firm size dummies, 1 dummy for employees with unknown 
occupational qualification, 1 dummy for apprentices with other occupations, and 5 year 
dummies. Productivity: log(value added per capita), Gross Profits: log(value added 
minus total wage bill per capita). 
Source: LIAB 1997-2002. 
 
 
30
Table A4: System GMM Estimation 
  Productivity Gross Profits 
  Coef. t-Value Coef. t-Value 
L1 (y) 0.4733 10.37 0.4887 9.76 
Share of Apprentice Occupation Group 
(Ref.: Unskilled Workers): 
        
Commercial and Trade 3.8442 1.94 2.5895 2.02 
L1  -1.9406 -1.30 -0.8102 -1.12 
Manufacturing -0.1603 -0.07 -0.5222 -0.36 
L1  -0.1118 -0.05 0.5898 0.44 
Crafts and Construction -0.4390 -0.23 0.3236 0.29 
L1  -0.9130 -0.51 -0.9206 -0.88 
Further Job Characteristics (Ref: Unskilled 
Workers): 
        
Share of Skilled Workers 0.6837 1.19 0.1770 0.49 
L1 -0.5879 -1.11 -0.1799 -0.53 
Share of Part Time Workers 1.4794 1.53 0.5766 0.96 
L1 -0.9690 -0.99 -0.2286 -0.38 
Schooling Level (Ref.: without Completed 
Apprenticeship and with Secondary School 
Degree): 
        
Share without a Completed Apprenticeship 0.3621 0.64 0.1897 0.54 
Share with a Completed Apprenticeship and 
without a Secondary School Degree 
-0.0357 -0.10 -0.0186 -0.09 
Share with a Completed Apprenticeship and 
with an Secondary School Degree 
1.7184 1.89 1.2333 1.99 
Share with a Polytechnic Degree 1.5658 1.95 1.0828 1.87 
Share with a University Degree -0.0012 0.00 -0.4434 -1.02 
Share of Foreigners -1.0700 -1.35 -0.5971 -1.04 
Establishment Characteristics:         
Log(Investment per Capita) 0.0056 0.21 0.0037 0.23 
L1 0.0087 0.32 -0.0033 -0.20 
Company founded during last 5 Years 0.0379 1.04 0.0225 0.98 
Dummy: Exporting Company 0.0809 2.40 0.0502 2.35 
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Table A4 continued: 
Dummy: Works Council 0.0942 2.99 0.0363 1.86 
Dummy: Collective Bargaining Contract 0.0250 1.02 0.0071 0.48 
Dummy: Located in East Germany -0.2514 -2.99 -0.0777 -1.49 
Number of Establishments (Groups) 1879   1879   
Number of Instruments 269   269   
Wald chi2(46) 1326.79   840.70   
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(1) in First 
Differences (p-Value) 
0.00   0.00   
Arellano-Bond Test for AR(2) in First 
Differences (p-Value) 
0.54   0.77   
Hansen Test of Over-Identification 
Restrictions (p-Value) 
0.14   0.13   
Notes: Regressions include 2 firm size dummies, 1 dummy for employees with unknown 
occupational qualification, 1 dummy for apprentices with other occupations, 11 industry 
and 5 year dummies. Productivity: log(value added per capita), Gross Profits: log(value 
added minus total wage bill per capita). Source: LIAB 1997 - 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A5: Minimum Distance Estimator after System GMM 
  Productivity Gross Profits 
  Coef. t-Value Coef. t-Value 
L1 (y) 0.4417 11.27 0.4661 10.42 
Share of Apprentice Occupation Group 
(Ref.: Unskilled Workers):         
Commercial and Trade 2.5468 3.58 0.9683 2.78 
Manufacturing -0.0277 -0.04 -1.2437 -2.65 
Crafts and Construction 1.3915 2.22 1.4731 3.80 
Further Job Characteristics (Ref: 
Unskilled Workers):         
Share of Skilled Workers 0.9723 5.09 0.2696 2.31 
Share of Part Time Workers 1.3336 4.03 0.1687 0.85 
Log(Investment per Capita) -0.0105 -0.84 0.0065 0.82 
Note: Only variable displayed which includes contemporary and lagged variables. 
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Table A6: Lagged OLS 
  Productivity Gross Profits 
  Coef. t-Value Coef. t-Value 
L1 (y) 0.7084 80.39 0.7230 84.08 
Share of Apprentice Occupation Group 
(Ref.: Unskilled Workers): 
        
Commercial and Trade 2.3221 3.46 1.2228 2.92 
L1  -1.0420 -1.59 -0.2485 -0.61 
Manufacturing -0.9361 -1.72 -0.7176 -2.12 
L1  0.5229 0.93 0.4876 1.39 
Crafts and Construction 0.4408 0.77 0.3296 0.93 
L1  -0.9176 -1.64 -0.5368 -1.54 
Further Job Characteristics (Ref: 
Unskilled Workers): 
        
Share of Skilled Workers 0.3414 1.92 0.1625 1.47 
L1 -0.3044 -1.74 -0.1489 -1.36 
Share of Part Time Workers 0.8089 2.98 0.5445 3.22 
L1 -0.9158 -3.35 -0.5349 -3.14 
Schooling Level (Ref.: without Completed 
Apprenticeship and with Secondary School 
Degree): 
        
Share without a Completed Apprenticeship -0.0957 -0.95 -0.0097 -0.15 
Share with a Completed Apprenticeship 
and without a Secondary School Degree 
-0.0133 -0.19 0.0429 0.98 
Share without a Completed Apprentice-
ship and with an Secondary Degree 
0.5951 3.34 0.4109 3.71 
Share with a Polytechnic Degree -0.0011 -0.01 0.0581 0.68 
Share with a University Degree 0.2283 2.03 0.1463 2.09 
Share of Foreigners 0.0360 0.31 0.0198 0.27 
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Table A6 continued: 
Establishment Characteristics:         
Log(Investment per Capita) 0.0313 1.51 0.0092 0.72 
L1 -0.0029 -0.14 0.0076 0.59 
Company founded during last 5 Years 0.0355 1.25 0.0198 1.12 
Dummy: Exporting Company 0.0667 3.52 0.0387 3.28 
Dummy: Works Council 0.0573 3.28 0.0244 2.26 
Dummy: Collective Bargaining Contract 0.0316 1.88 0.0148 1.42 
Dummy: Located in East Germany -0.1187 -6.28 -0.0448 -3.86 
R2 0.6471   0.6354   
F(46,  5869)  233.93   222.35   
Number of Establishments (Observations) 5916   5916   
Notes: Regressions also include 2 firm size dummies, 11 industry, 1 dummy for employees 
with unknown occupational qualification, 1 dummy for apprentices with other 
occupations, and 5 year dummies. Productivity: log(value added per capita), Gross 
Profits: log(value added minus total wage bill per capita). 
Source: LIAB 1997-2002. 
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Table A7: Lagged Fixed Effect Estimation 
  Productivity Gross Profits 
  Coef. t-Value Coef. t-Value 
L1 (y) 0.0411 2.79 0.0481 3.17 
Share of Apprentice Occupation Group 
(Ref.: Unskilled Workers): 
        
Commercial and Trade 0.7019 0.81 -0.0775 -0.14 
L1  -1.9786 -2.71 -0.8732 -1.90 
Manufacturing -1.2974 -1.99 -0.8266 -2.01 
L1  1.6877 2.63 1.2324 3.04 
Crafts and Construction 1.4828 1.98 0.6088 1.29 
L1  -0.6831 -1.02 -0.0427 -0.10 
Further Job Characteristics (Ref: 
Unskilled Workers): 
        
Share of Skilled Workers 0.0433 0.19 0.0613 0.42 
L1 -0.0792 -0.36 -0.0506 -0.36 
Share of Part Time Workers 1.5477 4.33 0.8436 3.74 
L1 -0.3273 -0.98 -0.1153 -0.55 
Schooling Level (Ref.: without Completed 
Apprenticeship and with Secondary School 
Degree): 
        
Share without a Completed Apprenticeship -0.4590 -0.93 -0.4228 -1.35 
Share with a Completed Apprenticeship 
and without a Secondary School Degree 
-0.5749 -1.33 -0.4304 -1.58 
Share without a Completed Apprentice-
ship and with an Secondary Degree 
-0.0044 -0.01 -0.1121 -0.26 
Share with a Polytechnic Degree -0.1773 -0.28 -0.7332 -1.83 
Share with a University Degree -0.0052 -0.01 -0.3627 -0.95 
Share of Foreigners -1.5410 -3.26 -1.2274 -4.11 
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Table A7 continued: 
Establishment Characteristics:         
Log(Investment per Capita) 0.0009 0.04 -0.0028 -0.17 
L1 0.0212 0.87 0.0028 0.18 
Company founded during last 5 Years -0.0019 -0.04 0.0254 0.83 
Dummy: Exporting Company -0.04 -1.03 -0.03 -1.19 
R2 0.0262   0.0266   
F(31,4006) 3.48   3.53   
Number of Establishments (Groups) 1879   1879   
Notes: Regressions include 2 firm size dummies, 5 year dummies, 1 dummy for employees 
with unknown occupational qualification. Productivity: log(value added per capita), 
Gross Profits: log(value added minus total wage bill per capita).  
Source: LIAB 1997-2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A8: List of occupational categories 
 Number of occupation in IABS 
Commercial and Trade 681-706,751-773,781-784,856,922 
Manufacturing 141-162,191-291,311-323,541-543,547,631-634,744,857 
Crafts and Construction 53,121-135,163-177,302-306,391-422,441-514,544-
546,741-744,804,901-921,923-937 
Note: the plain text of the selected occupations can be found in Alda (2005).  
 
 
 
